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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, wherein the noted
Justice stated:
To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means-to declare that the government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that per-
nicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.13
In his admirable but possibly over-zealous and overbroad adher-
ence to the spirit of these remarks Judge Mansfield may have severely
restricted the legitimate operations of United States agents abroad in
order to deny to the Government the fruits of this particular "poisonous
tree."
Joseph R. Farris
DOMESTIC RELATIONS--PENNSYLVANIA EQUAL RIGHTS AMEND-
MENT REVERSES THE COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION THAT THE
HUSBAND, BECAUSE OF HIS SEX, SHOULD BEAR THE PRIMARY
DUTY OF CHILD SUPPORT. Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324 (Pa.
1974.)
Warren Dana petitioned for a reduction in the amount of his child
support payments because his income had declined and also because
his former wife had obtained employment and was therefore able to
contribute to the support of their two minor children. Pursuant to his
divorce, Dana had been paying $300 per month child support. As
a result of the decline in his income from $12,400 per year to $10,600
these payments constituted one-half of his entire net income. The trial
court, in denying his petition, held that the father had the primary duty
of support and therefore the mother's financial resources were not to
be considered in determining the amount of his payments. The trial
court also held that paying one-half of his net income as child support
was neither confiscatory nor punitive in nature. The superior court af-
firmed the trial court decision, and appeal was taken to the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court.' Prior case law had established a presumption
23. 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
1. Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324 (Pa. 1974).
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that the father, on the basis of his sex alone, and without regard to the
actual financial position of either parent, was primarily liable for the
support of the minor children of the marriage. The supreme court in
Conway v. Dana ruled that this presumption was no longer valid be-
cause of the recently passed equal rights amendment (ERA) to the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 2 With this first judicial construction of a
state ERA, the court summarily removed a long enduring rule of law.
This decision forecasts the potential for even broader and more sweep-
ing changes through an ERA to the United States Constitution.
It is significant to note that although a new constitutional amend-
ment was required in Pennsylvania to attack sex-based discrimination
in the law of domestic relations, other states, including Oklahoma, have
achieved similar results without a constitutional amendment. Some
courts have used the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to attack sex discrimination. Dana suggests that the ERA will
be far more effective than equal protection in attacking sex discrimina-
tion in general. The obvious reluctance and caution on the part of the
courts in employing equal protection to attack sex-based discrimination
has prompted increased support for the adoption of state and federal
ERA's. Nonetheless, equal protection may continue to have some via-
bility in this area.
Pennsylvania case law which placed the primary duty of child sup-
port upon the father3 is the common law rule followed in a majority
of states.4 Since the primary duty of support is on the father, the fi-
nancial position of the former wife is of little or no significance.' This
2. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. The amendment provides, "Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because
of the sex of the individual."
3. Commonwealth ex rel. Bortz v. Norris, 184 Pa. Super. 594, 135 A.2d 771
(1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Kreiner v. Scheidt, 183 Pa. Super. 277, 131 A.2d 147
(1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Silverman v. Silverman, 180 Pa. Super. 94, 117 A.2d 801
(1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Heller v. Yellin, 174 Pa. Super. 292, 101 A.2d 452
(1953).
4. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 488 (1968); see, e.g., Kasbeer v. Kas-
beer, 22 Ill. App. 2d 218, 159 N.E.2d 840 (1959); Parks v. Parks, 209 Ky. 127, 272
S.W. 419 (1925); State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 42 N.W.2d 680 (1950).
5. McQuade v. McQuade, 145 Colo. 218, 358 P.2d 470 (1960) (the fact that the
mother was self-supporting did not relieve the father of his primary duty of support for
the children); Martin v. Martin, 251 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1952) (the fact that the former
wife inherited $100,000 was not allowed to be considered in determining the amount
the husband should pay in child support); cf. Duncan v. Duncan, 146 So. 2d 255 (La.
1962) where the court held:
The principle that a father is primarily liable for the support of his mi-
nor children is too well established to necessitate comment. If a father under
such an obligation voluntarily chooses to increase his financial obligations by
[Vol. 10
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rule evolved in the early nineteenth century when a woman's sphere
of activity did not range far outside the home. It was a time when
women were to be "protected" by limiting their legal and economic ob-
ligations. Such an attitude has endured in the law long after the disap-
pearance of any justifying circumstances. Pennsylvania chose the ERA
as its vehicle for obtaining legal equality between the sexes.
In a few jurisdictions such as Iowa and the District of Columbia 7
mother and father have been charged coequally with the duty of child
support by statute rather than by case law. The Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act also takes the position that the support obligation is as
much the responsibility of the wife as of the husband."
a subsequent marriage, he must do so at his own risk and without impairment
of the responsibility to his children. Id. at 256.
6. IOWA CODE § 597.14 (1950); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 204 N.W.2d 634 (Iowa
1973) (the court said: "Both parents are liable for the support of their children, not
necessarily in equal shares but proportionately according to their ability to pay." Id.
at 636.); Addy v. Addy, 240 Iowa 255, 36 N.W.2d 352 (1949) (the court said: "At
common law and in most states the father is primarily liable for the support of his chil-
dren.
However in this state by reason of Code section 597.14, which provides the reason-
able and necessary expenses of the family are chargeable upon the property of both hus-
band and wife. . . ." Id. at-, 36 N.W.2d at 358.)
Professor Clark, in researching the Iowa cases under this statute, has expressed the
opinion that in spite of this statutory equality most support orders still follow the com-
mon law rule, for in most cases the father is ordered to pay the support for the children.
H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 488-489 n.7 (1968).
7. 16 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916 (1973). In Moezie v. Moezie, Family Division
No. D3535-71 (Dist. of Columbia 1973), noted in K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY,
SEX-BASED DISCRIM'NATION 250 (1974). the court construed the statute:
Prior to 1970, the District of Columbia followed the common law rule re-
garding the responsibility of parents for the support of minor children. This
rule placed the primary obligation for the support of minor children upon the
father. In 1970, however, the enactment of 16 D.C. Code, Section 916(c)
made the obligation a joint one of both mother and father. This court is of
the opinion that this Section of the code, when read in light of its legislative
history and in the context of the other changes made in the code at that time
regarding family matters indicates a legislative intent to make the responsibility
for support of minor children an equal one of mother and father. The logic
of this conclusion is all the more compelling in view of the improved economic
position of women generally in our society and especially of the mother in-
volved here (who earns in excess of $17,000 per annum) as well as the more
integral role women play in family fiscal affairs. This Court therefore feels
no hesitancy in reaching a result similar to that reached by other jurisdictions
vith statutes similar to 16 D.C. Code, Section 916(c) and will order that Mrs.
Moezie pay monies toward the support of her minor children in the custody
of the father.
Id. at 254.
8. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 309, noted in K. DAVIDSON, R. GINS-
BURG, & H. KAY, SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION 278-279 (1974), provides:
Section 309. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation,
maintenance, or child support, the court may order either or both parents ow-
ing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an amount reasonable
or necessary for his support, without regard to marital misconduct, after con-
sidering all relevant factors including:
3
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Dana agreed with the trial
court's finding that the burden of support had become onerous for the
husband due to a reduction in his income. But the supreme court ex-
pressly noted that this situation, standing alone, was not so oppressive
and unfair that a denial of the husband's request for relief warranted
a finding of an abuse of discretion." However, the court said, since
the effect of the ERA was to require that the wife's increased financial
resources be considered, and since it was questionable whether the
lower court's decision reflected her increase, a reconsideration of the
case was necessary. The supreme court felt that "Combining the de-
crease in the father's income along with the additional income resulting
from the mother's recently acquired employment provides a sufficient
change in circumstances to warrant a modification of the original
order."'1
0
A question remains whether a change in the financial condition
of only one party could ever constitute sufficient grounds for modifica-
tion. Some cases suggest that such unilateral change is not sufficient,"1
but other cases hold that a change in the father's financial position
alone will justify a modification, provided the deterioration or improve-
ment is substantial or material. There are no definitive standards for
substantial or material,' 2 but if the ruling in Dana is to be followed,
(1) the financial resources of the child;
(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent;
(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the mar-
riage not been dissolved;
(4) the physical and emotional condition of the child, and his educa-
tional needs; and(5) the financial resources and needs of the non-custodial parent.
9. Warren Dana paid $300 in child support from a net salary of $600. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that these facts constituted insufficient grounds for
modification without even commenting on the prior contradicting case of Common-
wealth ex reL Bush v. Bush, 170 Pa. Super. 382, 86 A.2d 62 (1952), cited in appellant
Dana's Brief. That case held that a support order of $225 was too high and should
be reduced to $180 where the father's monthly salary was $655. Brief for Appellant
at 12, Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324 (Pa. 1974).
10. 318 A.2d at 326-27.
11. Green v. Green, 232 Ark. 868, 341 S.W.2d 41 (1960) (the expenses of the hus-
band's new family on remarriage together with the wife's increased financial condition
warrants a modification of the support decree); Goldring v. Goldring, 94 Cal. App. 2d
643, 211 P.2d 342 (1949); Hensinger v. Hensinger, 54 N.W.2d 610 (Mich. 1952) (the
court hinted that if the husband's income had declined instead of remaining the same,
he would have been entitled to modification of support if this factor could have been
coupled with the wife's increase in income).
12. Sandier v. Sandier, 165 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 1969) (a net increase of $825 in
the husband's income and the fact that the child had entered college justified a support
increase from $47 to $75 per month); Bryant v. Bryant, 102 N.W.2d 800 (N.D. 1960)
(a decrease of the husband's income from $1,250 per month to $1,100 per month did
not constitute a substantial enough reduction in income, in light of his total income, to
4
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Pennsylvania may well require more than 50% of net income to go for
child support before a modification will be granted solely on the basis
of one party's changed financial position.
Oklahoma, while claiming to follow the common law rule for sup-
port obligations, has actually established a coequal liability for the sup-
port of the children through its case law. There is no specific state-
ment by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to this effect, nor is there much
probability that Oklahoma is ready to order a wife to pay support, but
it is certain that Oklahoma does consider the financial circumstances
of the wife as a key factor in modifying a decree for support. From
this point of view, the Oklahoma cases are in line with Dana although
the result has been achieved through case law rather than an ERA.
As early as 1917, Oklahoma placed the duty of child support upon
the husband. 3 This duty has been periodically reaffirmed in subse-
quent case law. In Green v. Green,14 citing Yahola v. Berryhill,'s the
Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the court's power of supervision
over the welfare of children is founded in equity, rather than law. The
court also stated in Green and Yahola that the father's primary duty
of support for his children was enforceable by statute" as well as com-
mon law.
In the 1969 case of Walsh v. Walsh,'7 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court again affirmed the presumption that the father bears the primary
duty of support. Yet the court modified the severity of this rule by
taking cognizance of the wife's inheritance, and lowering the amount
of the husband's support order. 8 In Walsh, the wife cited Minnesota,
justify a modification of the decree); Beaird v. Beaird, 380 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) (the husband's financial condition had been changed substantially; however the
change was brought about through remarriage, which cannot affect the duty to his chil-
dren).
13. Ahrens v. Ahrens, 67 Okla. 147, 169 P. 486 (1917) (in discussing the effects
of a contract of separation on a subsequent divorce, the court said: "This woman could
not by contract relieve Mr. Ahrens of his obligation to his baby children, which the con-
tract unqualifiedly attempted to do.")
14. 309 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1957).
15. 180 Okla. 637, 71 P.2d 968 (1937).
16. These cases do not cite to a particular statute, but it can be inferred that they
refer to OLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 4 (1971) which provides:
The parent entitled to the custody of a child must give him support and
education suitable to his circumstances. If the support and education which
the father of a legitimate child is able to give are inadequate, the mother must
assist him to the extent of her ability.
17. 460 P.2d 122 (Okla. 1969).
18. The supreme court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in low-
ering payments from $450 to $325 per month, where the wife's financial condition was
substantially enhanced as a result of an inheritance even though the husband, paying
the support, was also better off financially than when the support order had been en-
tered. Id.
1975]
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Florida, and Kentucky cases to bolster her argument that the primary
duty of support is on the father, and therefore the mother's improved
financial condition should not be considered in calculating the amount
to be paid by the father. The court rejected this reasoning and chose
to follow such states as California and Kansas, where the improved fi-
nancial position of the wife is one of many factors to be considered in
deciding whether or not grounds for modification exist.19
In Walsh the court also stated that the modification of child sup-
port orders came within the discretion of the trial court, and that its
decisions were to be governed by considerations of justice and equity.
Thus, by holding that the wife's financial condition is relevant in setting
the amount of support, and by injecting equitable policies into this de-
termination, the supreme court has made it possible for an Oklahoma
district court to declare that equity and the best interests of the child
require that the wife share the duty of support coequally with her
former husband. In this way the Oklahoma court, without benefit of
an ERA, has softened, if not removed, the presumption that the hus-
band, because of his sex, is the party most able to provide support.
Conway v. Dana is the first case construing the Pennsylvania ERA,
and it foreshadows the ERA's potential as a strong and powerful
weapon in the fight against sex-based discrimination. In attempting
to assess the impact of this case, it is important to understand why state
or federal ERA's are now being utilized rather than existing constitu-
tional safeguards such as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The United States Supreme Court devised a two-tiered
equal protection standard for testing the constitutionality of legislative
classifications. A recent California case described this test:
We have followed the two-level test employed by the
United States Supreme Court in reviewing legislative classi-
fications under the equal protection clause. [Citations omit-
ted.]
In the area of economic regulation, the high court has
exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption
of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions
drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship
to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. [Citations.] On
the other hand, in cases involving "suspect classifications" or
touching on "fundamental interests," the court has adopted an
19. Cf. Dodson v. Dodson, 461 P.2d 937 (Okla. 1969) (the husband's increased ex-
penses due to his subsequent remarriage were held to be a factor for consideration in
modification of a support decree).
490 [Vol. 10
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attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classi-
fication to strict scrutiny. [Citations.] Under the strict
standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of
establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which
justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law
are necessary to further its purpose.
Prior to the ERA, equal protection was the best available method of
fighting sex-based discrimination in Pennsylvania. However it was not
very effective since the Pennsylvania court had upheld state statutes
which discriminated so long as the classifications were based upon
".. . reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious or unjustly discriminat-
ing differences ... ."21 Thus one can see that Pennsylvania had em-
ployed the reasonable classification test for equal protection rather than
the suspect classification test which would subject a statute to close ju-
dicial scrutiny. Only California has declared classifications based upon
sex to be inherently suspect.12
The United States Supreme Court has consistently declined to de-
clare sex a suspect legislative classification, and in a few cases it has
employed the reasonable classification test. Reed v. Reed23 concerned
an Idaho statute which gave a preference to males in the selection of
estate administrators. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous
court, applied the reasonable classification test and declared that creat-
ing a preference merely to avoid hearings on the merits and to avoid
intrafamily controversy constituted an arbitrary legislative choice, vio-
lative of the equal protection clause. Most recently, in Frontiero v.
Richardson4 four Justices stated that classifications based upon sex
should now be declared suspect. However, the other four concurring
Justices still refused to extend the strict test of equal protection that
far. Three Justices, including the Chief Justice, in again declining to
declare sex a suspect classification, held that it would be better for the
20. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16, 485 P.2d 529, 538-39 (1971).
21. The statute referred lo was the "Muncy Act" which provided for different length
sentences for women than for men. Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d
400 (1968); see also Adler v. Montefiore Hospital Ass'n of W. Pa., 311 A.2d 634 (Pa.
1973) (statutes which affect some groups of citizens differently than others are pre-
sumed to be constitutional if any state of facts will reasonably justify it. Only classifi-
cations based on alienage, race and nationality call for close judicial scrutiny); McIl-
vaine v. Pennsylvania State Police, 309 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1973) (notice was taken of the
fact that four of eight United States Supreme Court Justices had declared sex to be a
suspect classification in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and the Pennsyl-
vania court noted that this may be an emerging trend).
22. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529 (1971).
23. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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people themselves to decide this issue by voting through their legisla-
tures either for or against the ERA to the United States Constitution,
than to have the Supreme Court make the choice for them on this con-
troversial issue. Perhaps through these cases the Court has shown that
equal protection will never become a clear-cut and reliable remedy to
right the wrongs of sex discrimination. Many commentators have felt
that the very make-up of the Supreme Court itself would prevent it
from ever declaring classifications by sex suspect: "A Supreme Court
apparently retreating from a period of activism and reform is unlikely
to add women to the groups entitled to special protection under the
fourteenth amendment. '25
Even if the Court should declare sex a suspect classification at
some future date, the test of strict judicial scrutiny would still contain
a possibly fatal weakness.
The suspect classification test provides a potential basis for
more comprehensive protection against sex discrimination;
under its operation, sex-based classifications would be con-
sidered "suspect" and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.
But because this doctrine allows the government to justify
even a suspect classification by "compelling reasons," it
would permit some classifications based on sex to survive.20
Therefore the inference can be drawn that a constitutional amendment
may indeed be necessary to completely outlaw all forms of sex dis-
crimination.
In conclusion, Dana should convince any skeptics that an ERA will
bring broad and immediate changes in the status of women under our
present legal system. While equal protection has been effective in at-
tacking sex-based discrimination in a few cases of obvious abuse, while
hope has been held out that sex may be declared a suspect classifica-
tion, and while states such as Oklahoma and Iowa, by case law and stat-
ute, have removed preferences based upon sex in the specific area of
child support, nonetheless the equal rights amendment clearly offers
more promise for the future than any of these methods as the best
means of eradicating all forms of discrimination based upon sex.
Larry E. Evans
25. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Consti-
tutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 880 (1971).
26. Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of A Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARv. Civ.
RiGHTs-Civ. Lm. L. REV. 216, 218 (1971).
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